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Although academic freedom is considered a pillar of the academy in the United States, little 
legal precedent has been established to legitimize faculty academic freedom. Moreover, no 
legislation or case law outlines a hierarchy of academic freedom whereby institutional academic 
freedom may be positioned as authoritative over faculty academic freedom or vice versa. As a 
result, many institutions of higher education have violated academic freedom and then 
subsequently apologized for overstepping legal boundaries, stemming from infringing upon 
individuals’ rights that have not been codified through law. These apologies include a very 
recent one, where a university president’s remorseful remark regarding faculty academic 
freedom contradicted the university system’s own definition of faculty academic freedom, further 
blurring the concept. In this instance, the Texas Attorney General filed a brief stating faculty 
academic freedom did not exist, provoking an apologetic statement from the state flagship’s 
president. This case, along with others surveyed in this paper, illustrate a perennial struggle to 
outline freedoms and protections for individuals working within institutions of higher learning. 
These cases highlight an unresolved tension between institutional and faculty academic freedom 
which continue to blur the concept of academic freedom. Ultimately, balancing institutional and 
faculty academic freedom may require neither freedom positioned as authoritative over another. 
However, it is important for faculty to be aware of the specifics of their academic freedom at 
their institution. In this paper, we outline how one institutional system (The University of Texas) 
grants faculty certain freedoms but does not explicitly guarantee academic freedom, forcing 
apologetic institutional rhetoric. 
 
Correspondence related to this article should be directed to Z.W. Taylor, The University of 
Texas at Austin (zt@utexas.edu). 
 
 
Controversies over academic freedom for professors working in educational institutions are as 
old as Socrates and as current as this week’s edition of the Chronicle of Higher Education. 
Often, educational controversies such as academic freedom have been surrounded by apologetic 
rhetoric on behalf of scholars, institutional leaders, and other educational stakeholders. As 
educational institutions have developed, there have been countless attempts to limit academic 
freedom.  
 
Challenging Church doctrine, Friar Giordano Bruno was imprisoned for 8 years during the 
Inquisition because he proposed that the Earth was not the center of the universe and that life 
might exist on other stars. Refusing to recant and apologize, he was charged with heresy and 
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burned alive (White, 2002). In line with Bruno, Galileo also advocated that the sun, not the 
Earth, was the center of the universe. He was forced to apologize, recant his views, and 
subsequently spent the rest of his life under house arrest. However, the Vatican later issued an 
apology, reinforcing the necessity for scholars to pursue truth (Finocchiaro, 2010). In Nazi 
Germany, it is well known that some teachers—both secondary and postsecondary—were judged 
unfit to teach because of their race and their racial ancestry (Gordin, 2012), and in apartheid 
South Africa of the 1950s, teachers and students were excluded from working at or attending 
most universities if they were Black. Additionally, biologists in Russia were required to follow a 
strict code to ensure that their research findings agreed with Communist ideology. Disputed 
biologist, Trofim Lysenko, was put in charge of the Russian science agency, and he supervised 
purges of hundreds of scientists who did not align their research with Communist priorities 
(Gordin, 2012).  
 
Faculty academic freedom in the United States has remained a contentious issue, as numerous 
legal cases have rendered this type of freedom ambiguous and have not conclusively settled the 
issue. Subsequently, when institutions of higher education have violated this form of freedom 
according to case law, institutions have often apologized for denying what has not been codified 
by law: faculty academic freedom. These apologies underscore the tension surrounding 
institutional versus faculty academic freedom, two freedoms that have not been well defined by 
law or by practice. To elucidate this issue, we discuss the history of academic freedom and 
relevant case law. We then transition to notions of institutional academic freedom beginning in 
the 1980s in the U.S. context. Finally, we conclude with the University of Texas at Austin 
campus carry case in 2015, where the Texas Attorney General asserted that there is no academic 
freedom for faculty, and that only institutions have academic freedom. For educational 
stakeholders from a variety of groups, the overarching purpose of this paper is to provide a better 
understanding of how case law has forced institutional leaders to deny faculty academic freedom 
without much guidance, thrusting the credibility of all forms of academic freedom into flux. 
 
A Brief History of the Development of the University and Academic Freedom 
 
While there were centers of advanced learning in China, the Indus River Valley, Egypt, and Iran, 
the university came of age during the medieval era, most prominently in Europe. As the Goths 
and Norse retreated north, people began moving to the cities, fueling the demand for advanced 
training for the church elite, civic leaders, and other functionaries. A city offered the opportunity 
to bring together a much larger group of scholars and students, and the universitas was born 
(Fuchs, 1963).  
 
Two structural models were followed in forming the university. First, guilds were developed to 
administer the daily working of the educational institution. Most of the guilds were run by the 
scholars and the University of Paris (nicknamed the University of Masters) was the model. 
However, at the University of Bologna in Italy, a student guild ran the university. The students 
oversaw hiring, firing, paying the faculty, and providing candles for the classrooms. The second 
structural form was the residential model versus the graduate-only model. Oxford and 
Cambridge represented the residential model, admitting undergraduates only, while residences 
were organized into smaller living-learning quads. The second model, developed by the 
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Germans, focused on graduate training and research production located away from 
undergraduate programs (Fuchs, 1963).  
The beginnings of academic freedom began “in the philosophy of intellectual freedom, which 
originated in Greece, arose again in Europe, especially under the impact of the Renaissance, and 
came to maturity in the Age of Reason” (Fuchs, 1963, p. 431). During the Age of Reason, 
scholars were simply not hired, and in other cases, they were dismissed because of challenging 
the established orthodoxy, practicing a religion that was against the local tradition, and holding 
liberal political beliefs (Fuchs, 1963). In this era, scholars were terminated at the first sign of 
independent thinking unless they recanted and showed remorse toward their institution (Fuchs, 
1963). As a result, the Age of Reason introduced one of the great power struggles in higher 
education and one that continues to this day: the power of the institution versus the power of the 
faculty.  
 
Perhaps no other country’s higher education system influenced the United States as did 
Germany, as Heidelberg University (est. 1386), Leipzig University (est. 1409), and the 
University of Munich (est. 1472) were founded to educate both undergraduates and graduates. 
This institutional framework provided the foundation for an expansion from undergraduate to 
graduate programs in the United States, starting with Johns Hopkins University in 1876 (Lucas, 
2006). As the U.S. developed more graduate programs in the late 1800s and early 1900s, many 
of the U.S. faculty sought the more established and prestigious doctoral degrees from German 
universities. Upon returning to the U.S., the faculty members expected the freedom to teach and 
research afforded at German institutions, most prominently Heidelberg University (Fuchs, 1963). 
They were vexed to learn of the absence of protections to perform their jobs properly in the 
United States, where graduate programs that were much more research-intensive were not nearly 
as established as their German counterparts. In this regard, the seeds of modern academic 
freedom had been planted (Lucas, 2006). 
 
Challenges to Academic Freedom and Subsequent Apologies 
 
With the expansion of the U.S. system of higher education from the Morrill Land Grant Acts and 
private universities established by large donors in the late 1800s and early 1900s, several 
academic freedom cases gained national attention (Lucas, 2006). These academic freedom cases 
were signs that the U.S. system of higher education was maturing, evidenced by professional 
faculty organizations emerging and gaining considerable power, such as the American Economic 
Association, American Sociological Society, and the American Political Science Association. 
Moreover, early academic freedom cases highlighted the considerable financial implications of 
faculty power, as large endowments by robber barons who lobbied for a more conservative 
Academy highlighted the tension between institutions, faculty members, and sources of 
philanthropic funds. Additionally, institutions were experiencing increased scrutiny of university 
financial operations by government officials who levied public taxes to support the institutions, 
including funding faculty salaries (Lucas, 2006). 
 
In this section, we discuss four of the most blatant, controversial cases concerning academic 
freedom that precede the formation of the American Association of University Professors 
(AAUP). All four cases specifically address academic freedom for professors and discuss the 
3
Taylor and Somers: Controversial and Contradictory: Historical and Contemporary Apol
Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2021
112 
 




subsequent apologies provided by the institutions of higher education for faculty violations of 
academic freedom or institutional censure of faculty members. 
 
The Stanford Controversy 
 
Stanford University was founded in 1885 and endowed by Jane and Leland Stanford, Senior in 
honor of their son, Leland Junior, who died at the age of 15. After Leland Senior’s death, Jane 
took responsibility and managed the early operations of the university. Ed Ross was hired to 
teach at Stanford in 1893 after obtaining a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University and teaching at 
Cornell University and Indiana University. As a result of his political views, Ross was fired in 
1900, clashing with Jane Stanford on two major issues: economic reform and Ross’ views on 
race suicide (Bromberg, 1996). However, before he was fired, Ross received considerable 
support from Stanford’s President, David Starr Jordan, who was praised for being a staunch 
advocate for faculty academic freedom and free speech (Bromberg, 1996). 
 
In support of Ross, William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic candidate for President of the 
United States, asked Ross to join him on the campaign trail as a public speaker and advocate, 
providing Ross a large public platform to espouse his beliefs. When campaigning for Bryan, 
Ross implied that he spoke as a Stanford professor and not as a private citizen. Though he was 
not sanctioned by the university for his political affiliations, it seems Ross’s eventual dismissal 
stemmed from his eugenicist views and divisive rhetoric below:  
 
The Oriental can elbow the American because he has fewer wants…to let this go on, to 
let the American be driven by coolie competition…is to commit [white] race suicide… 
We are resolutely determined that California, this latest and loveliest seat of the Aryan 
race shall not become…the wolfish struggle for existence as prevails throughout the 
Orient. (Bromberg, 1996, p. 116)  
 
Jane Stanford wrote angrily to President David Starr Jordan, a fellow eugenicist alongside Ross, 
objecting to Ross’ speech, stating, “The teaching of violence is inconsistent with the Founding 
Grant [of Stanford University]” (Bromberg, 1996, p. 116). Subsequently, Ross was fired and 
eight of his colleagues resigned in protest after the chair of Stanford University’s History 
department, George Howard, refused to show remorse and apologize in writing for Ross’ firing 
(Eule, 2015, para. 46). This case illustrates that faculty academic freedom may not supersede 
institutional freedom. Moreover, institutional exercising of that freedom may have wide reaching 
consequences, such as the resignation of nearly an entire faculty department over the treatment 
of one faculty member, despite that faculty member’s xenophobia. 
 
However, the legacy of Stanford President David Starr Jordan was honored in the state of 
California after several primary and middle schools were named after Jordan in the mid-20th 
century. Given Jordan’s controversial views on eugenics and his association with a divisive 
figure such as Ed Ross, the Burbank Unified School Board recently voted to change the name of 
David Starr Jordan Middle School (Sahakyan, 2019). Burbank Unified School Board members 
apologized to the Burbank community, stating, “Were he alive, David Starr Jordan would have 
no place in Burbank” (Sahakyan, 2019, para. 6). Ultimately, the Burbank Unified School Board 
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felt compelled to apologize for a university president whose rigorous defense of faculty 
academic freedom and free speech was at one time admired, but now has been reflected upon 
and is viewed as controversial, xenophobic, and racist. 
 
The University of Chicago Controversy 
 
Edward Bemis began his career at the University of Chicago as a tenured Associate Professor in 
the Extension Division in 1892. He left the University in October of 1896 under duress. Rumors 
of the reason for his firing still abound, as years earlier he criticized Chicago’s public utilities 
and the “gas trust” and supported the Pullman strike in Chicago, which could have led these local 
businesses to lower their philanthropic support of the institution (Berquist, 1972). There were 
also rumors that he was incompetent, he did not make enough money for the institution, and had 
angered trustees and donors over his support of the Pullman strike (Berquist, 1972).  
 
William Rainey Harper, president of the University of Chicago publicly weighed in, asserting, 
“It is hardly safe for me to venture into any of the Chicago clubs. I am pounced upon from all 
sides” (Berquist, 1972, p. 389). Ultimately, Harper issued Bemis’ termination in 1895 but gave 
him until October 1896 to leave the University, attempting to save face and preserve the 
institution’s reputation. Bemis was very successful after leaving Chicago, publishing widely and 
opposing the privatization of public utilities. However, by that time, Harper had raised 
considerable funds from John D. Rockefeller and had greatly expanded the University of 
Chicago, in part by hiring vocal faculty members such as Bemis. Harper also expanded the 
University’s reach by catering to public sentiment and allowing the dissemination of anti-
Christian ideology, something Rockefeller and Harper felt uneasy about given their devout 
Christianity.  
 
Against Rockefeller’s wishes, Harper defended faculty academic freedom and allowed anti-
Christian theatre performances to take place on the University of Chicago’s campus. After 
internal pressure from local officials and institutional stakeholders, Harper apologized to 
Rockefeller. Of the anti-Christian theatre performance, Harper remorsefully wrote to 
Rockefeller, “The whole event must be regarded as a mistake” (Olasky, 2019, para. 23). Here, 
Harper may have apologized due to the institutional or political pressure he was facing, but there 
was no case law to compel his apology, and Harper never addressed the legal protections he did 
or did not have regarding the decision to allow anti-Christian theatre performances. 
 
In this instance, institutional founders and powerful public figures, such as John D. Rockefeller, 
have provoked institutional apologies from institutional leaders allowing a free flow of (at times) 
controversial ideas and faculty academic freedom. The Chicago apology came at the expense of 
the apologist, President William Rainey Harper, who had ironically terminated a faculty member 
(Bemis) for outspoken views and exercising faculty academic freedom mere years before Harper 
himself allowed outspoken, non-Christian views on campus in an effort to advance the university 
by engaging with both Christian and non-Christian philanthropists and businesses. Recently, the 
University of Chicago reaffirmed their support of academic freedom, free speech, and free 
expression, with President Robert Zimmer issuing a statement in March 2019 urging that, 
“Failing to provide an education of deep intellectual challenge supported by an environment of 
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free expression is selling students short and would fail to live up to our highest aspirations as 
educators” (Zimmer, 2019, para. 2). However, Zimmer did not specifically cite academic 
freedom, nor did he delineate institutional from faculty academic freedom. 
 
The Wharton Eight Controversy 
 
Scott Nearing received his doctoral degree in Economics from the Wharton School of Business 
at the University of Pennsylvania, where he began teaching as a tenured faculty member in 1909. 
He was one of the “Wharton Eight,” faculty members whose goal was to contribute to society, as 
well as to the students and university. In 1915, despite faculty endorsement, Nearing was the 
only Assistant Professor who was not promoted and tenured. University trustees had noted 
Nearing’s progressive views, particularly those on child labor laws. Nearing sued the university 
and won, which was a significant victory for faculty tenure rights. He then went to the University 
of Toledo, a municipal university. He lasted there two years before his opposition to World War 
I led to his termination.  
 
In later years, Nearing was charged with violating the Espionage Act and the Sedition Act but 
was exonerated on both counts. Of his firing, he observed that “those who tell the truth or try to 
tell the truth are among the first victims of any war” (Nearing, 1919, p. 33). Nearing founded and 
directed a pacifist group during the war, gave lectures, and traveled to and lived in communist 
countries. In the 1930s and 1940s, he and his partner bought a farm and forested area in Maine 
and embraced a simple rural life. In the 1960s, anti-war activists and potential homesteaders 
flocked to Maine to learn from him, as he appeared in the movie Reds (1981) as a “witness” to 
the Russian Revolution. Ultimately, the University of Pennsylvania apologized to Nearing years 
later, reversed his termination, and named him an Honorary Emeritus Professor of Economics 
given his profound impact on the field and advocacy of academic freedom. Combined with the 
lawsuit, this was the most extensive reparation for a faculty member fired for an academic 
freedom transgression. 
 
The University of Wisconsin Controversy 
 
Richard Ely received a doctorate in Economics from the University of Heidelberg and a 
Doctorate of Laws from Hobart College. He was a progressive and part of the Social Gospel 
Movement which applied Christian principles to social problems. He was professor and head of 
the Department of Political Economy at Johns Hopkins University. In 1892, he became a 
professor of Political Economy and Chair of the School of Economics, Political Science and 
History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. In 1894, an ex officio member of the University 
of Wisconsin Board of Regents attempted to oust Ely from his position for teaching “utopian, 
impractical and pernicious doctrines” (Tiede, 2015, p. 64).  
 
At the time, the University of Wisconsin was well known in academic circles for its Wisconsin 
Idea, or the guiding principle that university work should benefit the citizens of the state of 
Wisconsin (Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 2019). Citing the Wisconsin Idea 
and the necessity for faculty members to exercise academic freedom (Board of Regents of the 
University of Wisconsin System, 2019), the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents made an 
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unprecedented and controversial decision in the wake of calls for Ely’s termination. Instead of 
giving into the whims of an ex-board member, the Board apologized to Ely and gave a ringing 
endorsement of academic freedom acknowledging that competing claims of truth are subject to 
the process of “sifting and winnowing” over time, echoing the verbiage of the Wisconsin Idea. 
Subsequently, Ely and Wisconsin were celebrated as strong defenders of academic freedom 
(Tiede, 2015), with the Ely case highlighting an instance where faculty academic freedom was 
defended by not only a single institution but an entire Board of Regents even though no 
Constitutional law or case law compelled such a defense. 
 
Professional Associations and Academic Freedom 
 
Before the AAUP’s development of codified faculty academic freedom, there is no accurate 
accounting of how many faculty members were fired or forced to resign during the years of Ed 
Ross, Edward Bemis, Scott Nearing, and Richard Ely. Many terminations were of single faculty 
members, but other cases involved groups of faculty members. Some faculty members left in 
protest when a colleague was fired or left quietly rather than being outspoken about censorship, 
referred to as “academic asphyxiation” (Tiede, 2015, p. 38). Ed Ross once remarked, “The only 
wonder is that there ever was any case that presented the question of academic freedom. Nothing 
but honesty or the blundering of a college president could ever allow such a case to show itself” 
(Tiede, 2015, p. 39). Ross’ words were prophetic, as many years passed without such a case 
being heard in a court. Yet, these aforementioned cases were hotly discussed and debated by 
faculty members across the country who measured and calculated their own behavior and 
exertion of faculty academic freedom (Tiede, 2015).  
 
The first discussion of a national professional association for faculty members was in 1912. That 
spring, Arthur Lovejoy, a philosophy professor at Johns Hopkins University, sent a letter to 
faculty at nine elite research universities (Tiede, 2015). The letter, which came to be known as 
the Hopkins Call, outlined three objectives for the proposed association: a forum for discussion 
of problems common to universities and professors, a source of information for the profession, 
and a method to harness collective action. The call also suggested possible issues for discussion 
such as university governance, educational policy, tenure, dismissal, professional ethics, and 
finally, a “representative judicial committee” to investigate academic freedom and tenure 
violations (Tiede, 2015, p. 76). There were immediate cautions from professors at several 
universities that the group might become a radical trade union. An organizational meeting was 
held in November 1913 with 18 delegates from nine universities. The delegates discussed the 
terms of membership for the group and recommended individual memberships for faculty who 
had taught at least 10 years but not instructors, as instructors taught but usually did not conduct 
potentially controversial research or participate in public forums. A Committee on Organization 
was formed and had 34 members by the end of 1914 (Tiede, 2015). 
 
After considerable discussion, the mailing list for the inaugural meeting consisted of 1,300 
names from 149 institutions (Tiede, 2015). The call for the meeting listed many issues for the 
professors to consider, including investigation of serious violations of academic freedom (Tiede, 
2015). The Inaugural meeting of AAUP took place on January 1 and 2, 1915. Unsurprisingly, the 
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first year was focused on one issue: academic freedom. In that year, 30 complaints of violations 
of academic freedom were filed and five investigations were conducted (Tiede, 2015). 
 
The 1915 Declaration of Principles 
 
The AAUP Declaration of Principles (American Association of University Professors, 1915; see 
also Wilson, 2015) was drafted by a group of senior faculty members. Walter Metzger, who 
chronicled the modern history of academic freedom, described the document as “Utilitarian in 
temper and conviction, as the theorists of 1915 did not view expressional freedoms of academics 
as a bundle of abstract rights” (Bastedo et al., 2016, p. 36). Metzger continued:  
 
[Academic institutions] must be prepared to tolerate a broad range of issues. . . Academic 
institutions that sought repress or silence such views simply did not deserve the respect of 
the higher education community. . . Thus, concluded the declaration, any university that 
placed restriction on the intellectual and expressive freedom of its professors [is] a 
proprietary institution and should be so described in making appeals for funds. (Bastedo 
et al., 2016, p. 36)  
 
However, the principles were not without their detractors. A New York Times editorial criticized 
the principles by saying, “Academic freedom…the inalienable right of every college instructor to 
make a fool of himself and his college by . . .intemperate, sensational prattle . . .and still be kept 
on the payroll” (Bastedo et al., 2016, pp. 36-37). 
 
The principles were groundbreaking and controversial in that they included tenure and a 
recommendation for due process (written notice, hearing, and written decision). A faculty 
member who believed that her or his institution violated the principles could ask for an AAUP 
investigation that could lead to censure, and a censured university could take enough remedial 
action to be taken off the list. The group gained power in the 1920s and 1930s, and by 1940, the 
American Association of Colleges and Universities had gained the support of 150 scholarly 
groups and many research and liberal arts institutions as co-sponsors (Bastedo et al., 2016).  
 
Ultimately, the AAUP and its principles took the first national step toward codifying a sense of 
academic freedom with substantial backing power of hundreds of institutions and tens of 
thousands individual faculty stakeholders. The AAUP also helped to establish mass support of 
faculty academic freedom with the power of mass faculty strikes and other forms of protest and 
advocacy to protect faculty academic freedom in the absence of any law supporting such a 
freedom. 
 
World War I, the Red Scare, and McCarthyism 
 
With the 1917 entry of the U.S. into World War I, opposition to the war and any form of support 
of German culture or unpatriotic behavior became the focus of many academic freedom cases 
(Tiede, 2015, p. 147). AAUP conducted several investigations, and in a report titled, “Academic 
freedom during war time,” the AAUP retracted some of the 1915 principles. AAUP’s committee 
chairperson, A. A. Young, acknowledged several cases that had arisen, but said that “we have to 
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recognize that some things are just at present vastly more important than is academic freedom” 
(Tiede, 2015, p. 150), suggesting that faculty academic freedom may come secondary to national 
priorities, far superseding any form of institution-level freedoms or priorities. In the years that 
followed the war, Tiede (2015) noted that the AAUP did little to push against restrictions to 
academic freedom during the war, and subsequent cases of faculty academic freedom highlighted 
the AAUP’s loss of power. 
 
During the first Red Scare, the national office of the AAUP was asked to investigate the firing of 
Professor Eduard Prokosch, a German professor at the University of Texas at Austin. He was 
terminated in 1919 because his textbook compared a German legislative assembly to federalism 
in the U.S. The University of Texas at Austin AAUP chapter opposed his reinstatement “because 
it would be misleading and unfair to the University of Texas” (Tiede, 2015, p. 169). Perhaps 
prior to World War I, the AAUP may have more staunchly defended Prokosch, but given the 
prioritization of nationalism and the pressure the AAUP may have been facing to position itself 
as patriotic in the wake of major world wars, the AAUP never advocated for Prokosch, and he 
was not reinstated.  
 
The McCarthy hearings (and the state equivalents of the McCarthy Commission) that targeted 
communists took the greatest toll on faculty academic freedom. However, there were mostly 
accusations of subversiveness by informants without evidence (Tiede, 2015). Of the faculty 
called to testify in front of state or federal legislators, many of them refused to speak, refused to 
identify other faculty as communists, or told vague stories of their experiences that didn’t indict 
them. Many states required faculty members working at public institutions to sign a loyalty oath 
to the state and the United States, famously highlighted by the Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957) 
and Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. (1966) cases. Both cases involved 
faculty members who either rejected national loyalty oaths or who lectured about Communist 
topics, likely violating loyalty oaths. Some of the best-known research universities such as 
Harvard, Michigan, Rutgers, and University of Washington were responsible for the dismissals, 
with the estimated number of faculty members fired during McCarthyism being about 170 
(Schrecker, 1986). 
 
Yet, the Sweezy case and Justice Frankfurter’s opinion most directly commented on the freedoms 
of the university—not the faculty member—by introducing the four essential freedoms to the 
understanding of academic freedom. Frankfurter wrote that the university—not individual 
faculty members—have the freedom to “to determine for itself on academic grounds who may 
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study” (Sweezy v. 
New Hampshire, 354 U.S.). It is important to note that a Justice’s opinion does not constitute 
case law and that Justice Frankfurter very clearly indicated that the four freedoms belong to the 
institution, not the faculty member. Since the Sweezy decision and Justice Frankfurter’s opinion, 
no other case law or opinion has made such an open statement defining what is or is not 
academic freedom and for whom (Goldberg & Sarabyn, 2011; Hiers, 2007). 
 
Given the lack of case law and ambiguity surrounding institutional versus faculty academic 
freedom, faculty repression has continued through 9/11 and into the 21st century. Just as in WWI 
and WWII, fear and xenophobia combined to fan the flames of patriotism in the wake of the 
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September 11th terrorist attacks on New York’s Twin Towers. The reaction was swift, with 
confrontations occurring the evening of September 11 between peace activists and those wanting 
immediate military intervention before all of the facts were clear. One well-known peace activist 
and University of Texas at Austin Journalism faculty member, Bob Jensen, wrote an op-ed for 
the Houston Chronicle urging restraint until other options than war was chosen. Jensen was 
inundated with hate mail, phone messages, and threats. In addition, the president’s office was 
flooded with phone calls. In response, the UT President Larry Faulkner wrote in the Chronicle 
that “Jensen is not only misguided but has become a fountain of undiluted foolishness on issues 
of public policy” (Nichols, 2001, para. 3). In this regard, Jensen had spoken in his official 
capacity as a UT faculty member and recognized public policy expert, yet institutional leadership 
was libeling Jensen and deterring his faculty academic freedom in the process. Although cases 
such as Sweezy and Keyishian were argued and decided in support of academic freedom and the 
avoidance of chilling First Amendment protections, UT President Faulkner, in this scenario, 
directly contradicted this case law. Faulkner never issued Jensen an public apology. 
 
Case Law and Ambiguous Notions of Academic Freedom 
 
Decades of case law and legal research has posited that institutional academic freedom—if it 
truly exists—does not supersede the individual academic freedom of faculty members (Hiers, 
2004, 2007; Tiede, 2015; Wilson, 2015). In fact, some legal scholars have suggested both federal 
and Supreme Court rulings have not entitled institutions to their own academic freedom or 
institutional autonomy under the First Amendment (Hiers, 2004,2007). However, an argument 
can be made for separate but equal institutional and faculty academic freedoms, with neither 
freedom superseding the other. Instead, these separate freedoms serve different ends and 
educational stakeholders. This nuanced understanding of academic freedom is critical for the 
future of higher education in the United States. 
 
Understanding that Frankfurter’s opinion in Sweezy laid groundwork for academic freedom 
limited to institutions, legal scholars have indicated that a presence of one freedom—institutional 
freedom—does not necessarily cancel out another, such as faculty academic freedom. Hiers 
(2007) pointedly asserted that until 1978 (Bakke), no court ruling had supported the notion of 
“constitutional institutional academic freedom” (p. 4). In Regents of University of California v. 
Bakke (1978), the only mention of constitutional institutional academic freedom was in 
concurring opinions and not expressly stated in the case law or majority opinion of the court 
(Hiers, 2007). In Bakke, Justice Powell’s solo opinion (non-concurring) held that prior 
institutional academic freedom cases—namely Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957) and Keyishian 
v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. (1966)—granted universities academic freedom 
under the First Amendment, echoing of the four essential freedoms quoted from Justice 
Frankfurter’s opinion in Sweezy. Yet, Hiers (2007) argued that Justice Powell’s statement 
incorrectly conflated constitutionally permissible goals, such as attaining a diverse student body, 
with institutional academic freedom. Lost in the argument was the role of the faculty member as 
they relate to any form of academic freedom. 
 
Ultimately, Hiers (2007) reasoned that Justice Powell’s opinion was not case law and did not 
suggest institutional academic freedom ought to outweigh faculty academic freedom, which had 
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been deemed constitutional in previous rulings. Moreover, Justice Powell’s opinion ignored the 
fact that Keyishian addressed teachers’ academic freedom, not institutional academic freedom or 
institutional autonomy. Justice Powell’s opinion also misappropriated Justice Frankfurter’s 
Sweezy opinion by applying Frankfurter’s quote from a South African educational context and 
inserting it into a United States-specific discussion of institutional academic freedom. In short, 
Powell’s misattributed concurring opinion—despite originating in the Supreme Court—does not 
serve as case law nor ratify institutional academic freedom.  
 
Discussing a later case related to Bakke, Hiers (2004) positioned Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) as a 
case that has ultimately perpetuated the constitutional misconception of institutional academic 
freedom, especially as it relates to First Amendment protections. Again, citing Justice 
Frankfurter’s opinion in Sweezy and Justice Powell’s misappropriation of Frankfurter’s opinion 
in Bakke, Hiers focused on the language of the First Amendment, arguing, “The First 
Amendment protects speech or viewpoint expression, but not institutional decisions or actions” 
(p. 577). At its surface, Hiers’ argument hinges on Grutter’s involvement with the First 
Amendment and whether admissions policies are “institutional decisions or actions,” which they 
undoubtedly are. Following this logic, Grutter did not reason that the University of Michigan’s 
admission policies were protected by the First Amendment. Rather, Grutter supported the 
University’s decision to use affirmative action admissions policies within constitutional limits. 
This nuance is important to understand as it relates to faculty academic freedom: In both Bakke 
and Grutter, institutional academic freedom was conflated with constitutional guarantees, 
namely First Amendment rights. However, Bakke and Grutter did not ratify institutional 
academic freedom—they tailored any sense of institutional academic freedom around the First 
Amendment. In short, Bakke and Grutter upheld institutional practices if and only if they did not 
violate the First Amendment. 
 
Hiers (2004) then reasoned, “And while the First Amendment protects private persons, public 
colleges and universities are not persons” (p. 577). Hiers’ second argument, that of public 
colleges and universities not being persons, is important in its relation to faculty academic 
freedom. In Grutter, the Supreme Court ruled that an institution had the right to cater its 
admission policies to support affirmative action in ways that did not violate any single person’s 
constitutional rights. Again, echoing of Bakke, the institution has never been granted protection 
by the First Amendment. Instead, Grutter and Bakke reaffirmed the notion that institutions 
cannot violate the First Amendment. Moreover, Grutter offered no hierarchy of Justice 
Frankfurter’s four essential freedoms, meaning that if institutional academic freedom did indeed 
exist, it existed alongside faculty academic freedom, which had been supported in prior case law, 
as long as such freedom did not violate the First Amendment. The difference here is one between 
First Amendment protection and First Amendment violation: institutional and faculty academic 
freedom cannot violate the First Amendment and is not protected by the First Amendment. 
 
Some believe academic freedom can be applied to an institution in order to keep government 
from impacting certain units of the academy (Goldberg & Sarabyn, 2011), while others argue 
academic freedom belongs entirely to the institution and not individual faculty members (Hiers, 
2004, 2007; Wilson, 2015). In Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), the Supreme Court’s unambiguous 
declaration that courts must give a “degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, 
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within constitutionally prescribed limits” (Goldberg & Sarabyn, 2011, p. 220). From here, 
however, there has been no legal guidance—from case law or the legal research community—as 
to what “constitutionally prescribed limits” means when considering institutional academic 
freedom compared to student or faculty academic freedom. Complicating the discussion of 
institutional versus faculty academic freedom is that the Grutter decision primarily addressed the 
constitutionality of an institution’s ability to diversify its student body, not protect itself against 
government intrusion or grant any of the four essential freedoms power over each other. If 
Grutter affirmed the institution’s essential freedom of who may be admitted to study, it surely 
did not in any way deny faculty academic freedom. 
 
If institutional academic freedom does exist and does so on the same plane as faculty academic 
freedom, perhaps the best argument can be found in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 
(1819). Therein, the Supreme Court famously ruled that a public entity, the state of New 
Hampshire, could not compel a privately-funded institution (Dartmouth College) to become a 
public institution: The court ruled such an action unconstitutional. The Dartmouth case was the 
origin for the rationale behind institutional academic freedom, namely that a government could 
not—and still cannot—interfere in contracts between private parties. This sense of government 
intrusion is what many scholars have pointed to as a crux of institutional academic freedom, 
mainly a freedom from government intrusion. To be clear, as a private institution, Dartmouth 
enjoyed institutional academic freedom from government intrusion but could not violate any one 
person’s First Amendment rights: Institutions are granted freedom from government intrusion 
but not the power to override constitutional protections. Dartmouth in no way positioned 
institutional academic freedom above faculty academic freedom, especially considering public 
institutions and the relevant case law associated with public institutions (Bakke, Grutter, 
Sweezy).  
 
Campus Carry, Academic Freedom, and a Presidential Apology 
 
The political divide caused by the 2016 elections has prompted hate speech, hate mail, beatings, 
and killings over political beliefs, many of which have been directly witnessed on the campus of 
The University of Texas at Austin (UT Austin), Texas’ public flagship (Broyles, 2016). Perhaps 
the most controversial contemporary issue facing many institutions of higher education is the 
forced adoption of campus carry laws. These laws allow anyone with a licensed firearm to carry 
the firearm on public campuses with few exceptions (e.g., private and individual faculty offices). 
 
Speaking against campus carry and its potential impingement of academic freedom and admitted 
students’ right to learn, Jessica Jin, a UT graduate, organized the anti-campus carry group Cocks 
not Glocks. Jin led Cocks not Glocks by brandishing dildoes rather than firearms for protection. 
Soon after, Jin fell victim to doxxing, or, the researching of private information to be published 
online with malicious intent. As a result of her activism, Jin was forced to relocate frequently, 
living out of her car or sofa surfing around the nation (Broyles, 2016). Along with other anti-gun 
activists, she was parodied in a series of online videos depicting activists being shot in the head 
by a burglar (Broyles, 2016).  
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At every anti-gun rally in Austin, most which are family events (Najmabadi, 2018), the pro-gun 
lobby often stations itself along the parade route decked out with as many guns as they can 
muster. A pro-carry group organized protests very close to university property in 2018 
(Bongiovanni, 2018) and 2021 (Hall, 2021). The gun toting individuals symbolically “murdered” 
individuals dressed in Gun-Free UT shirts (Haurwitz, 2018). A few gun rights advocates carried 
automatic weapons and paraded up and down the sidewalk across from elementary schools (Hall, 
2021). These tactics by gun supporters are designed to frighten and intimidate school children, 
college students, and adults alike (Story, 2017). The stakes for free speech and academic 
freedom are higher than they have ever been as a result of these intimidation tactics, and unclear 
case law regarding academic freedom has exacerbated the problem and anxiety surrounding the 
issue. 
 
At UT Austin, the ongoing legal debate surrounding campus carry, or concealed carrying of a 
firearm on campus, illustrates the tension between ambiguous institutional academic freedom 
and codified faculty academic freedom. In the wake of the 2015 state law allowing concealed 
carry on campus, three UT Austin faculty members challenged the legal standing of university’s 
concealed carry policy. The faculty members—Jennifer Lynn Glass, Lisa Moore and Mia 
Carter—filed a lawsuit against State of Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton and leaders of the 
University of Texas System, alleging that the campus carry law infringed upon their First 
Amendment right to faculty academic freedom, as carrying a firearm into a classroom or learning 
space could and would produce a chilling effect. At the time of the pending lawsuit in 2018, 
Moore was quoted as saying, “I hope we don't have to have more deaths and school shootings to 
convince people that guns don't belong in the classroom” (Choi, 2018, para. 11). 
 
Supporting Jessica Jin’s activism, two national student activist groups spoke against the 
professors’ lawsuits, also citing academic freedom. The groups, Students for Concealed Carry 
(SCC) and the Students for Concealed Carry Foundation (SCCF), filed a joint amicus brief in 
support of the campus carry law, arguing that allowing professors or any academic staff member 
autonomy from state-mandated gun laws in the name of academic freedom could set a precedent 
for many institutional employees to use academic freedom to reject any institutional or state 
policy on the grounds of academic freedom violations (Choi, 2018). However, it is critical to 
note that Jessica Jin and Clocks not Glocks, as well as the pro-gun groups SCC and the SCCF, 
used the broad term “academic freedom” to justify their position(s), failing to delineate between 
institutional and faculty academic freedom. 
 
Soon after the UT Austin professors filed the suit, Ken Paxton and leaders of the University of 
Texas System issued a joint brief justifying their own position and using academic freedom as a 
crux of their argument. In the brief, Paxton wrote, “The right to academic freedom, if it exists, 
belongs to the institution, not the individual professor,” thus justifying the state’s campus carry 
law (Haurwitz, 2018, para. 2). Later, Paxton rephrased his earlier statement regarding academic 
freedom, explaining that “plaintiffs have no individual right to academic freedom, because the 
right to academic freedom is held by their institution” (para. 14). When asked about Paxton’s 
controversial opinion, U.S. District Judge Lee Yeakel explained that he could find no legal 
precedent for the professors’ academic freedom argument and that academic freedom falls under 
First Amendment. Subsequently, in July 2017, Yeakel dismissed the UT Austin professors’ case, 
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citing a lack of constitutional grounds (Haurwitz, 2018). This stands in stark contrast to the 
widely held belief that faculty indeed have some degree of academic freedom per the AAUP and 
its vast membership, built upon decades of legislation and Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in 
Sweezy. 
 
Confusing matters further, Marc Rylander, an official spokesperson for Texas Governor Greg 
Abbott asserted,  
 
There’s a difference between privileges a university uses its discretion to give and legal 
rights a person can sue over. Academic freedom is a privilege the University of Texas 
System, like so many universities, has given to its faculty. But the courts have not 
recognized academic freedom as a legal right an individual can sue over. (Haurwitz, 
2018, para. 14)  
 
For Rylander and the Governor of Texas, academic freedom is a right possessed by an institution 
of higher education and passed onto faculty. In this regard, faculty do not hold academic freedom 
independent of the institution. As a result, faculty academic freedom cannot be used in legal 
arguments against the institution for having violated faculty rights to that freedom. 
 
Amidst this debate, there was a single, important individual who had not explicitly voiced their 
concern or opinion: UT Austin President Greg Fenves. Both as President and a tenured faculty 
member on UT Austin’s staff, Fenves had represented the University of Texas System against 
the UT Austin professors in the campus carry lawsuit, but Fenves later issued a letter clarifying 
his own personal stance. In the letter, Fenves apologetically affirmed the importance of academic 
freedom to the mission of the university, reasoning that handguns on campus are “contrary to our 
mission of education and research, which is based on inquiry, free speech, and debate” (Fenves, 
2018, para. 3). Fenves then bluntly supported a specifically delineated notion of faculty academic 
freedom, writing: “Faculty members at The University of Texas at Austin have academic 
freedom to conduct research and publish their findings. All faculty members have academic 
freedom in the classroom to teach and discuss their subjects as they see fit” (Fenves, 2018, para. 
4). Fenves urged that “faculty members” have “academic freedom,” even if implying or failing to 
state that the institution granted that freedom to the faculty. Here, it seems Fenves argued the 
exact opposite of what the University of Texas System and state’s attorney general argued in 
court. A lack of legal precedent or political pressure, in this case, forced Fenves’ hand. 
 
Regardless of what institutional presidents (such as Fenves) or government officials say, no case 
law has positioned institutional academic freedom above faculty academic freedom (Hiers, 
2007). Here, President Fenves’ doublespeak misinterprets institutional academic freedom as 
somehow superior to faculty academic freedom, thus faculty rights can be impinged upon given 
the purview of state law. Moreover, institutional academic freedom has never been suggested to 
be held “by the institution” as UT Austin’s first statement posited (Haurwitz, 2018, para. 2). 
Hearkening back to Justice Frankfurter’s ill-quoted but insightful discussion of the four essential 
freedoms, it is critical to acknowledge these four freedoms as separate and—without legal 
contest—equal. As a result, case law from Bakke, Grutter, Borden, and Dartmouth only 
comment on the academic freedom of a certain stakeholder, whether institution or individual, 
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and the necessity for that freedom to avoid violating the First Amendment. In the case of 
institutional or state-mandated concealed carry policies at a public institution, the separate 
academic freedoms of the institution and faculty member must be weighed equally, with 
subsequent legal action taken if and only if First Amendment rights are violated. As a result, 
President Fenves may have felt compelled to apologize or clarify his own personal views and 
those of the Office of the President because he is both a tenured faculty member and institutional 
leader, possibly confusing the very notion of academic freedom entirely. 
 
Conclusion: The Controversies and Apologies of Academic Freedom 
 
Across history, evidence suggests institutional academic freedom and faculty academic freedom 
have consistently been confused, misinterpreted, and controversial. This confusion has since 
resulted in institutional leadership feeling coerced into apologizing for what has not been made 
clear through legislation, case law, or policy. For instance, the disagreement among the plaintiffs 
about institutional versus faculty academic freedom in the University of Texas campus carry case 
starkly demonstrates the difficulty in arguing for a singular definition that only universities can 
claim, urging university leadership to apologize for what they, perhaps, cannot control and what 
has not been settled through case law or constitutional precedent via the First Amendment.  
 
The argument that the State of Texas defense has presented is clearly a trial balloon for future 
cases, arguing that institutional and faculty academic freedom may be separate and unequal 
liberties. Although the case has not been argued in a legal setting, the State of Texas’ defense 
seems to be doublespeak or perhaps some kind of code in an attempt for institutional leadership 
to avoid contradictory statements or forced, awkward apologies to any stakeholders involved. 
After all, remorse may be considered an admission of guilt or wrongdoing in a court of law. 
Apology or not, doublespeak or otherwise, the decision to elevate institutional academic freedom 
above faculty academic freedom—if it even exists at all—seems a deliberate attempt to erode or 
eradicate faculty and student rights. 
 
Institutional academic freedom serves an important purpose to protect public universities from 
interference from government agencies, as illustrated by Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward (1819). Historically, outside actors have attempted to diminish the power of students 
and faculty through making public what has been established as private or vice versa. In light of 
this fact, faculty and institutions alike need to be vigilant about arguments on overarching power 
to censor debate and discovery.  
 
Some critics argue that Texas’s lawyers do not understand academic freedom and its key role in 
learning and discovery of new knowledge (Gun Free UT, 2021; Haurwitz, 2018). Either way, 
faculty academic freedom is supported by the AAUP, professional tradition, work rules, and the 
First Amendment. Faculty members must also not forget that scholars years ago—such as Friar 
Giordano Bruno—received multiple apologies from institutional authorities, yet still paid the 
ultimate price for exercising academic freedom. To continue exercising academic freedom, 
collective and legal action must confront challenges to academic freedom to prevent potential 
loss of life over such challenges, such as a campus carry law being adopted to allow firearms in 
scholarly, academic spaces. We must recognize intimidation tactics and any attempt at negating 
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these protections, even if that means provoking decades of institutional apologies to remedy this 
longstanding, controversial issue in higher education. And if faculty academic freedom does not 
exist, why is U.S. higher education history laced with apologies for trampling or eliminating 
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